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1 
UNSAFE HARBOR: THE EUROPEAN 
UNION’S DEMAND FOR HEIGHTENED 
DATA PRIVACY STANDARDS IN SCHREMS v. 
IRISH DATA PROTECTION COMMISSIONER 
CHRISTINA LAM* 
Abstract: In 1995, the European Union adopted the Data Protection Directive to 
govern the processing, use, and exchange of personal data. The United States re-
fused to enact similar legislation, consequently jeopardizing ongoing and future da-
ta transfers with the European Union. To prevent economic catastrophe, the United 
States negotiated with the European Union to reach the Safe Harbor Agreement 
and, on July 26, 2000, the European Commission formally recognized the agree-
ment as compliant with the Data Protection Directive in its Safe Harbor Decision. 
In 2013, U.S. data protection standards were once again placed under the micro-
scope when Edward Snowden leaked information regarding the National Security 
Agency’s surveillance activities. In the wake of these leaks, Maximillian Schrems 
filed a complaint with the Irish Data Protection Commissioner, claiming that Face-
book was not adequately protecting his personal data from National Security Agen-
cy surveillance when transferring it from its European Union servers to its U.S. 
servers. On October 6, 2015, the European Court of Justice invalidated the Safe 
Harbor Decision in Schrems v. Irish Data Protection Commissioner. This Comment 
examines the court’s reasoning and argues that the court erred in interpreting Arti-
cle 25 of the Data Protection Directive and overstepped jurisdictional boundaries. 
INTRODUCTION 
Both the United States and European Union (EU) avow a commitment to 
protecting data privacy, but their drastically different approaches have repeatedly 
been a source of tension.1 In 1995, the EU adopted the Data Protection Directive 
(DPD) as a comprehensive regulatory framework for processing, using, and ex-
changing personal data.2 The United States remained resistant to similarly stand-
ardizing its data protection practices, threatening the continuance of data trans-
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 1 See, e.g., MARTIN A. WEISS & KRISTIN ARCHICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44257, U.S.-EU 
DATA PRIVACY: FROM SAFE HARBOR TO PRIVACY SHIELD 1–2 (2016); Lee A. Bygrave, Transatlantic 
Tensions on Data Privacy 3–4, 6 (Transworld, Working Paper No. 19, 2013). 
 2 See, e.g., WEISS & ARCHICK, supra note 1, at 2; Lucas Bergkamp, EU Data Protection Policy: 
The Privacy Fallacy: Adverse Effects of Europe’s Data Protection Policy in an Information-Driven 
Economy, 18 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 31, 32–33 (2002). 
2 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 40:E. Supp. 
fers between the EU and the United States.3 Under considerable pressure, the 
United States negotiated with the EU to reach the Safe Harbor Agreement and, 
on July 26, 2000, the European Commission (Commission) recognized the 
agreement as compliant with the DPD in its Safe Harbor Decision (Safe Har-
bor).4 In 2013, U.S. data protection standards were, once again, a matter of con-
troversy when Edward Snowden exposed the U.S. National Security Agency’s 
(NSA) extensive surveillance activities.5 Ultimately, on October 6, 2015, the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) found that the United States provided an inade-
quate level of data protection and invalidated Safe Harbor in Schrems v. Irish 
Data Protection Commissioner.6 This decision aroused uncertainty for an esti-
mated 4500 U.S. companies and organizations that had been relying on Safe 
Harbor to legally carry out data transfers.7 
Part I of this Comment provides a brief background of Safe Harbor and its 
invalidation in Schrems v. Irish Data Protection Commissioner. Part II delivers a 
discussion of the relevant EU law, the arguments presented, and the court’s deci-
sion. Part III analyzes the decision’s importance and its implications for U.S. 
data privacy law. This Comment contends that the court misconstrued the term 
“adequate” in Article 25 of the DPD and invaded the jurisdictional province of 
the United States and all other countries outside of the EU. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Origins of Safe Harbor 
The EU’s lingering animosity towards past fascist and totalitarian policies 
of complete governmental control has inspired an ongoing campaign for person-
al data privacy.8 As part of that campaign, the EU adopted the DPD in 1995 to 
“ensure a high level of protection for the privacy of individuals in all member 
                                                                                                                           
 3 See WEISS & ARCHICK, supra note 1, at 5; Bygrave, supra note 1, at 7, 9. 
 4 See Commission Decision 2000/520 of July 26, 2000, Pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy of the Protection Provided by the Safe Har-
bour Privacy Principles and Related Frequently Asked Questions Issued by the US Department of 
Commerce, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 7, 8 (EC); WEISS & ARCHICK, supra note 1, at 5. 
 5 See WEISS & ARCHICK, supra note 1, at 8–9. 
 6 See C-362/14, Schrems v. Irish Data Prot. Comm’r, 2015 E.C.R. I-650, ¶ 106; WEISS & AR-
CHICK, supra note 1, at 6. 
 7 See WEISS & ARCHICK, supra note 1, at 6; Noëlle Lenoir, The Trouble with Schrems, PROJECT 
SYNDICATE (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/safe-harbor-troubles-max-
shrems-by-noelle-lenoir-2016-02 [https://perma.cc/93BW-G4GC]. 
 8 Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal Information and Public Sector Regula-
tion in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 553, 560 (1995) (“[T]otalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe 
relied on information gathering and data storage to weaken the individual capacity for critical reflec-
tion and to repress any social movements outside their control. Even without computers, these regimes 
demonstrated the fragility of the human capacity for self-determination in the face of widespread 
spying and data collection.”); see WEISS & ARCHICK, supra note 1, at 2; Bergkamp, supra note 2, at 
32. 
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states . . . and also to help ensure the free flow of information society services in 
the [EU] by fostering consumer confidence and minimizing differences between 
the Member States’ rules.”9 The DPD subjects nearly all data collection, usage, 
and transfers to a wide range of regulations and requires each EU member state 
to have at least one independent, data protection authority to monitor compli-
ance.10 
Under Article 25 of the DPD, transfers of personal data to non-European 
Economic Area countries (third countries) are only allowed if that country en-
sures an adequate level of data protection.11 Such data transfers between the EU 
and third countries have become commonplace with the rise of the global econ-
omy and the unbounded nature of the Internet.12 For example, EU companies 
routinely transfer and receive data from companies in third countries when seek-
ing digitally deliverable services such as consulting, architecture, design, and 
finance.13 
Both EU and U.S. government officials recognized that U.S. data protec-
tion standards were likely far too different from the DPD to be considered “ade-
quate.”14 As a result, the United States entered into negotiations with the EU, 
leading the U.S. Department of Commerce to issue the Safe Harbor Privacy 
Principles in 2000.15 Shortly thereafter, the Commission recognized the Safe 
Harbor Privacy Principles as ensuring an adequate level of data protection in its 
Safe Harbor Decision.16 Under Safe Harbor, a U.S. company or organization 
could legally participate in data transfers with the EU as long as it annually self-
certified to the U.S. Department of Commerce that it had complied with certain 
                                                                                                                           
 9 Colin J. Bennett & Charles D. Raab, The Adequacy of Privacy: The European Union Data Pro-
tection Directive and the North American Response, 13 INFO. SOC’Y 245, 249 (1997) (quoting Euro-
pean Commission Press Release IP/95/822, Council Definitively Adopts Directive on Protection of 
Personal Data (July 25, 1995)). 
 10 See Directive 95/46, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement 
of Such Data, arts. 3, 28, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 39, 47 (EC) [hereinafter Data Protection Directive]. 
 11 Id. art. 25. 
 12 See Joshua P. Meltzer, The Importance of the Internet and Transatlantic Data Flows for U.S. 
and EU Trade and Investment 10–11 (Global Economy & Development, Working Paper No. 79, 
2014) (estimating that economic activity that relies on transatlantic data flows accounts for forty per-
cent of U.S. exports to the European Union (EU) and fifty-two percent of exports from the EU to the 
United States). 
 13 See id. at 12. 
 14 See WEISS & ARCHICK, supra note 1, at 5; Bygrave, supra note 1, at 9. The Data Protection 
Directive (DPD) serves as an individual, comprehensive framework for protecting data across the EU. 
See WEISS & ARCHICK, supra note 1, at 2. In contrast, the United States has taken a piecemeal ap-
proach to data protection. See WEISS & ARCHICK, supra note 1, at 3. For instance, the U.S. Privacy 
Act of 1974 regulates personal data under the government’s control and an entirely separate law—the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986—prevents the government from obtaining personal 
data sent from computers. See WEISS & ARCHICK, supra note 1, at 3. 
 15 WEISS & ARCHICK, supra note 1, at 5. 
 16 Commission Decision 2000/520, supra note 4; WEISS & ARCHICK, supra note 1, at 5. 
4 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 40:E. Supp. 
principles and requirements regarding notice, choice, onward transfers, security, 
data integrity, access, and enforcement.17 
B. The End of Safe Harbor 
On June 25, 2013, Austrian national Maximillian Schrems brought a com-
plaint to the Irish Data Protection Commissioner (Commissioner) that, in light of 
leaked information regarding U.S. intelligence activities, Facebook’s EU-based 
servers in Ireland did not adequately protect the transfer of his data to its U.S. 
servers.18 Specifically, Schrems claimed that Facebook could not possibly have 
transferred his personal data in accordance with EU law because the NSA had 
been intercepting those transfers.19 The Commissioner refused to investigate 
Schrems’ complaint, taking the position that Facebook adhered to Safe Harbor 
and therefore provided an adequate level of data protection.20 The Commissioner 
further held that Schrems lacked evidence that the NSA had, in fact, accessed his 
personal data.21 Schrems appealed the Commissioner’s decision to the Irish High 
Court, which subsequently stayed the proceedings and submitted the case to the 
ECJ on July 17, 2014.22 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Questions Before the Court 
The Irish High Court asked the ECJ to consider two main questions in 
Schrems.23 The first was whether an existing Commission finding of adequacy 
                                                                                                                           
 17 See Commission Decision 2000/520, supra note 4, annex I, at 11–12; WEISS & ARCHICK, 
supra note 1, at 5–6. The European Commission’s Safe Harbor Decision (Safe Harbor) was an easy 
and cost-effective mechanism for complying with the DPD, but not the only mechanism. See Brian J. 
McGinnis & Brendan W. Miller, European Court of Justice Invalidates U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Agree-
ment, NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 9, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/european-court-justice-
invalidates-us-eu-safe-harbor-agreement [https://perma.cc/G5EM-6ZRC]. Alternative mechanisms 
include model contract clauses and binding corporate resolutions. McGinnis & Miller, supra. 
 18 Schrems, 2015 E.C.R. ¶¶ 26, 28. In 2013, Edward Snowden revealed that the National Security 
Agency (NSA) engaged in “upstream” collection, meaning it was intercepting Internet and telephone 
communications in and out of the United States on a “massive scale.” Jenna McLaughlin, Top Euro-
pean Court Rules That NSA Spying Makes U.S. Unsafe for Data, INTERCEPT (Oct. 6, 2015), https://
theintercept.com/2015/10/06/top-european-court-rules-that-nsa-spying-makes-u-s-unsafe-for-data/ 
[https://perma.cc/SSV6-YFA9]. The NSA also collected communications of “targeted individuals” by 
way of the PRISM program. McLaughlin, supra. 
 19 McLaughlin, supra note 18. 
 20 See Schrems, 2015 E.C.R. ¶ 29; WEISS & ARCHICK, supra note 1, at 6. 
 21 Schrems, 2015 E.C.R. ¶ 29. 
 22 Id. ¶¶ 30, 36. 
 23 C-362/14, Schrems v. Irish Data Prot. Comm’r, 2015 E.C.R. I-650, ¶ 36. The Irish High Court 
referred the following questions to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: 
 (1) Whether in the course of determining a complaint which has been made to [the 
Commissioner] that personal data is being transferred to another third country . . . the 
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binds the Commissioner when investigating a complaint.24 The second was 
whether the Commissioner had the authority or was required to conduct an in-
vestigation based on factual developments that had occurred in the time since the 
adequacy finding was made.25 Beyond the Irish High Court’s two questions, the 
ECJ also considered the broader issue of whether Safe Harbor was consistent 
with EU law.26 
B. Relevant Law 
In reaching its findings, the ECJ primarily relied on Articles 25 and 28 of 
the DPD as well as Articles 7, 8, and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union (EU Charter).27 Article 25 of the DPD provides that data 
transfers to third countries are only permitted if that country ensures an adequate 
level of data protection and the Commission is allowed to issue findings of ade-
quacy.28 Article 28 of the DPD requires member states to set up at least one pub-
lic authority to monitor compliance.29 Articles 7, 8, and 47 of the EU Charter 
protect individual rights to privacy, data protection, and an effective remedy and 
fair trial, respectively.30 
C. Arguments 
Schrems, along with the European Parliament, a number of member states, 
and Digital Rights Ireland, maintained that U.S. mass surveillance practices were 
incompatible with privacy and data protection rights guaranteed under the DPD 
and the EU Charter.31 Accordingly, Schrems claimed that his individual rights 
                                                                                                                           
laws and practices of which, it is claimed, do not contain adequate protections for the 
data subject, [the Commissioner] is absolutely bound by the Community finding to the 
contrary contained in [the Safe Harbor Decision] having regard to Article 7, Article 8 
and Article 47 of [the Charter], the provisions of Article 25(6) of Directive [95/46] 
notwithstanding? 
 (2) Or, alternatively, may and/or must the [Commissioner] conduct his or her own 
investigation of the matter in the light of factual developments in the meantime since 
[Commission Decision 2000/520] was first published? 
Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 See id. ¶ 67. 
 27 Id. ¶ 1. 
 28 Data Protection Directive, supra note 10, art. 25. 
 29 Id. art. 28. 
 30 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, arts. 7–8, 47, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 10, 20. 
 31 McLaughlin, supra note 18; Sam Schechner & Valentina Pop, Personal Data Gets Day in 
Court: Safe Harbor Agreement Allows Transfer of Personal Information from Europe to the U.S., 
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 24, 2015, 3:58 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/court-hears-challenge-to-safe-
harbor-data-deal-1427206554 [https://perma.cc/V637-68VX]; Sam Pfeifle, ECJ Hears Safe Harbor 
6 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 40:E. Supp. 
were violated even though he was unable to prove that the NSA retrieved his 
personal data.32 The Commissioner and the Commission admitted that Safe Har-
bor was flawed, but countered that the framework was too politically and eco-
nomically necessary to invalidate.33 The Commission gave assurance that Safe 
Harbor was still under negotiation and recommended a thirteen-point plan for its 
reform.34 The Commissioner and Commission argued that, given Safe Harbor’s 
extreme importance, the ECJ should allow it to stand in the interim.35 
D. The Court’s Holding 
In response to the first question posed, the ECJ answered in the negative, 
holding that Safe Harbor does not prohibit the Commissioner and other national 
Data Protection Agencies (DPAs) from investigating and assessing data transfers 
with third countries.36 The ECJ found that DPAs “must be able to examine, with 
complete independence, any claim concerning the protection of a person’s rights 
and freedoms in regard to the processing of personal data relating to him.”37 Alt-
hough the ECJ recognized that DPAs have a significant amount of authority, on-
ly the court has the authority to invalidate Commission decisions.38 
After identifying the court and Commissioner’s authority, the ECJ assessed 
Safe Harbor, ultimately finding it invalid.39 The ECJ interpreted the term “ade-
quate level of protection” in Article 25 of the DPD to require third countries to 
provide “a level of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms that is essen-
tially equivalent to that guaranteed within the European Union by virtue of . . . 
[the DPD] read in light of the [EU] Charter.”40 The ECJ found that Safe Harbor 
did not meet the essentially equivalent requirement because it allowed the Unit-
ed States to disregard Safe Harbor principles when in conflict with national secu-
rity, public interest, and law enforcement requirements, thereby undermining the 
fundamental right to privacy under Article 7 of the EU Charter.41 
The court also held that Safe Harbor was in conflict with Article 47 of the 
EU Charter because it did not refer to the existence of U.S. rules or legal protec-
tions intended to limit U.S. interference with data privacy, such as an effective 
                                                                                                                           
Arguments, IAPP: THE PRIVACY ADVISOR (Mar. 24, 2015), https://iapp.org/news/a/ECJ-hears-safe-
harbor-arguments/ [https://perma.cc/NP8N-F6CM]. 
 32 See Schechner & Pop, supra note 31. 
 33 See Pfeifle, supra note 31. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 See Schrems, 2015 E.C.R. ¶ 43. 
 37 Id. ¶ 99. 
 38 See id. ¶ 62. 
 39 Id. ¶¶ 100–103, 106. 
 40 Id. ¶ 73 (emphasis added). 
 41 Id. ¶¶ 73, 86–87. 
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judicial remedy.42 Rather, the system of self-certification, in which a company 
declares it will follow the Safe Harbor principles, would only be a reliable meas-
ure of adequacy if there were mechanisms in place to identify and reprimand 
non-compliant U.S. companies.43 The ECJ further found that, under Article 25 of 
the DPD, the Commission must evaluate a third country’s domestic laws and 
international commitments prior to making a determination on the country’s data 
protection standards.44 However, the Commission did not evaluate U.S. laws and 
international commitments when issuing Safe Harbor.45 
III. ANALYSIS 
Immediately after the ECJ issued its decision in Schrems v. Irish Data Pro-
tection Commissioner, the EU and the United States entered into negotiations to 
devise a suitable data protection framework to replace Safe Harbor.46 On Febru-
ary 2, 2016, an agreement was officially reached on “Privacy Shield” and the 
Commission issued its adequacy finding on July 12, 2016.47 Although Privacy 
Shield reflects the requirements that the ECJ set out in Schrems, these require-
ments were formulated on an erroneous and judicially imprudent interpretation 
of “adequate” under Article 25 of the DPD.48 Even with Privacy Shield in effect, 
it is unlikely that the EU will see the desired reforms in U.S. intelligence practic-
es.49 
                                                                                                                           
 42 Id. ¶¶ 81, 89, 95. 
 43 Id. ¶¶ 81, 89. 
 44 Id. ¶ 83. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Christopher Kuner, Reality and Illusion in EU Data Transfer Regulation Post Schrems, 18 
GERMAN L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 19–20), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2732346 [https://perma.cc/2WH6-9Q5T]. 
 47 European Commission Press Release IP/16/2461, European Commission Launches EU-U.S. 
Privacy Shield: Stronger Protection for Transatlantic Data Flows (July 12, 2016). See generally Letter 
from Penny Pritzker, U.S. Sec’y of Commerce, to Vêra Jourová, Comm’r for Justice, Consumers & 
Gender Equal., Eur. Comm’n (Feb. 23, 2016), https://www.commerce.gov/sites/commerce.gov/files/
media/files/2016/eu_us_privacy_shield_full_text.pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NWS-TTWV]. Privacy 
Shield is a lengthened, more specific version of the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles. WEISS & AR-
CHICK, supra note 1, at 9; see Kuner, supra note 46, at 20. It contains requirements in the following 
categories: notice, choice, accountability for onward transfer, security, data integrity and purpose 
limitation, access, and recourse, enforcement, and liability. WEISS & ARCHICK, supra note 1, at 9. 
Unlike Safe Harbor, Privacy Shield includes an arbitration model and commitments from U.S. nation-
al security officials. WEISS & ARCHICK, supra note 1, at 9, 10. 
 48 See Data Protection Directive, supra note 10, art. 25; Kuner, supra note 46, at 17–18; Memoran-
dum from Geoffrey Robertson, Doughty Street Chambers, to Facebook, ¶ 11 (Jan. 14, 2016), blogs.ft.
com/brusselsblog/files/2016/01/Geoffrey-Robertson-QC.docx [https://perma.cc/25CG-GBZW] [herein-
after Memorandum from Geoffrey Robertson]. 
 49 See Kuner, supra note 46, at 4. 
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A. Defining Adequate 
The ECJ conceded that the word “adequate” in Article 25 of the DPD does 
not require a third country to ensure a level of protection that is “identical” to 
that guaranteed under EU law.50 Apart from this one sensible limitation, the 
court found itself at liberty to adopt almost any interpretation of “adequate,” as 
the DPD does not provide a definition.51 The ECJ chose a very narrow interpre-
tation of “adequate”: third countries must have data protection standards in place 
that are “essentially equivalent” to the EU standards.52 The court’s use of the 
word “essentially” before “equivalent” makes the standard seem somewhat less 
rigid than “identical.”53 Even so, the essentially equivalent standard suffers from 
the same pitfalls as the identical standard: the text and structure of the DPD do 
not support it and it is overly burdensome on third countries.54 
The word “equivalent” is synonymous with the word “identical.”55 In add-
ing the word “essentially,” the ECJ made it clear that a third country’s level of 
data protection does not need to be identical to what the DPD provides.56 In 
English, “essentially” is defined as “relating to the most important characteristics 
or ideas of something.”57 Therefore, under the essentially equivalent standard, 
third countries are required to provide a level of protection that is basically the 
same or identical in central or primary respects as that guaranteed within the 
EU.58 
The plain language of the DPD neither requires nor insinuates the ECJ’s in-
terpretation of “adequate.”59 In a non-binding opinion submitted to the ECJ, Ad-
vocate General Bot identifies the English meaning of the word “adequate” as 
“satisfactory or sufficient” and contrasts it with the French meaning of “adéquat” 
                                                                                                                           
 50 C-362/14, Schrems v. Irish Data Prot. Comm’r, 2015 E.C.R. I-650, ¶ 73; see Data Protection 
Directive, supra note 10, art. 25. 
 51 See Schrems, 2015 E.C.R. ¶ 70.  
 52 Id. ¶ 73; see Kuner, supra note 46, at 17. 
 53 See Schrems, 2015 E.C.R. ¶ 73. 
 54 See Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 17–18, 24 (2012) (arguing that, 
in requiring third countries to provide an adequate level of data protection, the EU places unreasona-
ble restraints on business practices and imposes a high cost of compliance); Kuner, supra note 46, at 
17. 
 55 Equivalent, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
equivalent [https://perma.cc/2BE4-8A7X]. 
 56 See Schrems, 2015 E.C.R. ¶ 73. 
 57 Essentially, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/
essentially [https://perma.cc/MXA7-D5CF]. “Essentially” is the adverb form of “essential,” which 
means “of, relating to, or constituting essence” and “of the upmost importance.” Essential, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/essential [https://perma.cc/TME4-
VSWL]. 
 58 See Schrems, 2015 E.C.R. ¶ 73; Equivalent, supra note 55; Essentially, supra note 57. 
 59 See Schrems, 2015 E.C.R. ¶ 73; Data Protection Directive, supra note 10, art. 25; Kuner, supra 
note 46, at 17. 
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which is “appropriate.”60 Even under the more generous French definition, “ade-
quate” seems to imply a lesser standard than “essentially equivalent.”61 Given 
that the EU’s data protection framework has been identified as the “most ambi-
tious, comprehensive, and complex in the field,” it is conceivable that a third 
country could be found to have a level of data protection that is “appropriate,” 
but not close enough to what EU law provides to be considered “essentially 
equivalent.”62 
The essentially equivalent standard is not only contrary to the DPD’s plain 
language, but also to its overall structure.63 The DPD is very deferential to EU 
member states, imposing few requirements on their discretion in order to allow 
them to balance competing interests, such as economic relations and data priva-
cy.64 Accordingly, the European Parliament most likely left the language of Arti-
cle 25 vague to allow the Commission to balance competing interests and allow 
data transfers to continue under a wide range of data protection laws.65 The es-
sentially equivalent standard, however, significantly reduces the Commission’s 
discretion to issue findings of adequacy.66 For example, if a third country does 
not provide a level of data protection close to what is guaranteed in the EU, the 
Commission cannot find the third country’s data protection laws “adequate” 
even if such a finding will seriously jeopardize economic relations.67 
                                                                                                                           
 60 Opinion of Advocate General Bot, ¶ 142, Schrems, 2015 E.C.R. ¶ 142. 
 61 See id. 
 62 Bygrave, supra note 1, at 5; see Opinion of Advocate General Bot, supra note 60; Memoran-
dum from Geoffrey Robertson, supra note 48. Without much additional explanation, Advocate Gen-
eral Bot concluded that “the only criterion that must guide the interpretation of [adequate] is the objec-
tive of attaining a high level of protection of fundamental rights.” Opinion of Advocate General Bot, 
supra note 60. This objective has been argued to be “merely an aspiration” mentioned in the Preamble 
to the DPD. Memorandum from Geoffrey Robertson, supra note 48. Nevertheless, data protection 
laws may be “adequate” without affording a “high level” of protection. Memorandum from Geoffrey 
Robertson, supra note 48. 
 63 See Schrems, 2015 E.C.R. ¶ 73; MARTON VARJU, EUROPEAN UNION HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: 
THE DYNAMICS OF INTERPRETATION AND CONTEXT 97–98 (2014); JACQUES BOURGEOIS ET AL., 
SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, ESSENTIALLY EQUIVALENT: A COMPARISON OF THE LEGAL ORDERS FOR PRI-
VACY AND DATA PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND UNITED STATES 13 (2016); Bennett & 
Raab, supra note 9, at 252. 
 64 VARJU, supra note 63; Bennett & Raab, supra note 9, at 252. In Lindqvist, the European Court 
of Justice demonstrated the balancing exercise involved in considering whether Lindqvist violated the 
DPD when she posted church volunteers’ personal information on a website without their consent. See 
Case C-101/01, Lindqvist, 2003 E.C.R. I-12992, ¶¶ 12–14, 86. The court weighed “Mrs Lindqvist’s 
freedom of expression in her work preparing people for Communion and her freedom to carry out 
activities contributing to religious life . . . against the protection of the private life of the individuals 
about whom Mrs Lindqvist has placed data on her internet site.” Id. ¶ 86. 
 65 See VARJU, supra note 63; BOURGEOIS ET AL., supra note 63. 
 66 See Schrems, 2015 E.C.R. ¶ 73; VARJU, supra note 63; BOURGEOIS ET AL., supra note 63, at 
27. 
 67 See Schrems, 2015 E.C.R. ¶ 73; BOURGEOIS ET AL., supra note 63. But see Bennett & Raab, 
supra note 9, at 254–55 (arguing that it is dangerous for Commission decisions on adequacy to be 
influenced by wider political and economic concerns that are unrelated to data privacy). 
10 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 40:E. Supp. 
Perhaps the most problematic result of the ECJ’s interpretation of “ade-
quate” is its extraterritorial effect.68 That is, the “attempt to regulate by means of 
national legislation, adjudication or enforcement the conduct of persons, proper-
ty or acts beyond its borders which affect the interests of the State in the absence 
of such regulation under international law.”69 The international political system 
has historically been organized around the notion of equal sovereignty of states, 
meaning each state only has control over its territory.70 Therefore, any exercise 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction undermines the international order.71 
By requiring that third countries ensure a level of data protection that is 
very similar to what is provided in the EU, the ECJ has effectively dictated the 
rest of the world’s data protection legislation.72 Although essential equivalence is 
only required when a third country is involved in data transfers with the EU, it is 
often too technologically difficult or too costly to operate under multiple sets of 
data protection standards and to have to separate European from non-European 
data. 73 Consequently, many companies and organizations have adopted the 
standard used for EU data transfers as their global standard.74 
The ECJ should not have adopted the essentially equivalent standard in in-
terpreting Article 25 of the DPD.75 Rather, the court should have interpreted “ad-
equate” more broadly as “sufficient” or “satisfactory” in order to adhere to the 
spirit and text of the DPD and minimize the standard’s burden on third coun-
tries.76 Furthermore, the ECJ’s interpretation of “adequate” ignored the reality 
that cultural values and policy preferences, such as robust national security, 
heavily influence a country’s desired level of data protection.77 
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B. The Balance Between Privacy and National Security 
The ECJ cited many problems with Safe Harbor, but the decision to invali-
date it hinged on the unrestricted nature of U.S. intelligence practices.78 Admit-
tedly, U.S. law and practice allow for large-scale data collection.79 Even so, Safe 
Harbor’s invalidation was not legally justified and the ECJ exceeded its jurisdic-
tional authority in disallowing third countries from engaging in mass surveil-
lance.80 
The court found U.S. mass surveillance practices to be inconsistent with the 
right to private life under Article 7 of the EU Charter.81 Although the EU Charter 
does not directly bind the United States, the ECJ interpreted Article 25 of the 
DPD to require third countries to provide a level of protection that is “essentially 
equivalent” to that provided in the DPD “read in light of the EU Charter.”82 The 
DPD therefore extraterritorially binds third countries to the EU Charter and 
places a “per se limit” on mass surveillance practices.83 Even though the ECJ’s 
decision was concerned with the mass surveillance of EU citizens, the nature of 
mass surveillance renders it impossible to confine its targets.84 The court there-
fore effectively prohibits third countries from engaging in mass surveillance of 
both EU and non-EU citizens so long as they participate in data transfers with 
the EU.85 However, such an interpretation is contrary to international custom; 
many countries other than the United States engage in mass surveillance practic-
es, including EU member states.86 
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In requiring third countries to forego all mass surveillance practices in or-
der to participate in legitimate data transfers with the EU, the ECJ effectively 
tips the global balance in favor of privacy over national security.87 However, 
privacy is both a broad and culturally dependent idea and countries around the 
world balance privacy and national security in different ways.88 For example, the 
United States has allowed mass surveillance to occur, despite its detrimental ef-
fect on citizens’ privacy, due to its efficiency and importance to counterterrorism 
efforts.89 Following Schrems, however, third countries that engage in data trans-
fers with the EU are barred from making an individualized cost-benefit analysis 
of utilizing mass surveillance.90 
The ECJ was an improper forum to sanction the United States for employ-
ing mass surveillance practices.91 In fact, the U.S. government was not even an 
original party in Schrems and, consequently, is not directly bound by the deci-
sion.92 Instead, the Schrems decision more directly affected U.S. companies rely-
ing on Safe Harbor, prohibiting them from allowing their data transfers with the 
EU to operate as a medium for government intelligence gathering.93 However, 
even if the EU suspended data transfers to U.S. companies, the NSA has the 
technological capabilities to collect the data directly.94 To be effective, the prohi-
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bition on indiscriminate mass surveillance would likely need to be in the form of 
an international treaty.95 
C. Future Compromises 
With Privacy Shield in place, the United States has promised to respect the 
EU’s desire for a high level of data protection.96 The United States, however, is 
unlikely to honor that promise.97 The ECJ may decide to respond, like in 
Schrems, by invalidating Privacy Shield and, once again, threatening to suspend 
data transfers to the United States as leverage to renegotiate for increased data 
protection standards.98 In reality, however, the EU is far too economically de-
pendent upon the United States to seriously consider suspending data transfers.99 
In the continued absence of a comprehensive treaty, the EU will therefore have 
to be willing to recognize that its standards cannot be implemented on a global 
scale.100 
CONCLUSION 
In Schrems, the ECJ improperly interpreted the DPD and asserted extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction over third countries, but was nevertheless successful in push-
ing the United States to adopt more robust data protection standards under Priva-
cy Shield. It remains unclear, though, whether Privacy Shield will produce real, 
tangible change. Going forward, the EU must recognize that data protection 
standards vary with cultural norms and will likely have no choice but to ignore 
breaches of Privacy Shield for the sake of economic stability. The EU’s unwa-
vering efforts toward implementing its data privacy laws on an international 
scale only highlight the extent to which technological advances have obscured 
geographical boundaries. Accordingly, more attention should be given to negoti-
ating an international data protection treaty. 
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